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On the Relationship between Fertility, Development and Gender 
Equality: A Comparison of Western and MENA Countries
Zafer Buyukkececi, Henriette Engelhardt
Abstract: The changing macro-level relationship between fertility and development 
(i.e., the standard of living, health and education) from negative to positive for the 
most advanced economies has received considerable attention recently. Using 
aggregate data, we compare the relationship between fertility and development 
in Western countries with the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, where 
fertility rates are higher than in other regions with identical levels of development. To 
understand the drivers of this association, we further link fertility to the components 
of development as well as female labour force participation separately. Our fi ndings 
show that fertility and development were positively associated for only a short 
period in Western countries and that the relationship turned negative again in 
recent years. Recent data also show that there is no signifi cant relationship between 
fertility and development in MENA countries. These fi ndings indicate that the well-
acknowledged theories of fertility and development do not apply in every context.
Keywords: Fertility · Human Development Index · MENA region
1 Introduction
Seminal demographic literature, such as on the fi rst and second demographic 
transition theories, have postulated a negative relationship between fertility and 
development (Kirk 1996; Lesthaeghe 2010). To explain this negative association 
between fertility and development, mechanisms such as declining mortality and 
increasing child survival (Notestein 1945), investment in the quality rather than 
quantity of children and opportunity costs of motherhood in confl ict with female 
employment (Becker 1960) have been proposed.
One recognized mechanism used to explain the fertility-development nexus 
is gender equality, which has been highlighted as a necessary condition for “the 
transition from very high fertility to fertility around replacement level” (McDonald 
2000b: 432). More recently, however, new theoretical considerations suggest that 
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the established negative correlation between fertility and development has turned 
positive for the most advanced economies (Anderson/Kohler 2015; Goldscheider 
et al. 2015). Rising levels of gender equality with development are emphasized 
as the potential driver of the emerging positive association between fertility and 
development (Esping-Andersen/Billari 2015; McDonald 2000a/b). This is empirically 
supported by Myrskylä et al. (2009), who, in their study published in Nature, found 
that the relationship between the Human Development Index (HDI) and total fertility 
rate (TFR) reverses from negative to positive at advanced HDI levels. Although 
these fi ndings are consistent with theoretical expectations suggesting a reversal 
of the relationship between fertility and development from negative to positive due 
to advanced levels of gender equality, it remains unclear whether the observed 
association is actually driven by gender equality or other factors, including progress 
in living standards, education and health. 
Moreover, these theories and empirical assessments have focused mainly on 
Western countries (e.g., Anderson/Kohler 2015; Fox et al. 2019; Luci-Greulich/
Thévenon 2014; Myrskylä et al. 2009, 2011). Yet the evolutionary process of social 
change can be modifi ed by cultural and institutional context and is not the same 
across all societies (McDonald 1994; McNicoll 1980). Countries of the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA), for instance, showed considerable improvements 
in economic standard of living, education and health, which comprise the three 
main indicators of development. Despite the development progress, the region 
falls considerably short of indicators of gender equality such as women’s labour 
force participation and political empowerment (World Bank 2004), contrary to 
theoretical expectations and empirical evidence for other countries (Forsythe et 
al. 2000; Inglehart/Norris 2003). According to the World Economic Forum (2017), 
the MENA region globally ranks last in terms of gender equality with an average 
remaining gender gap of 40 percent. At the same time, the demographic patterns 
suggested by the demographic transition theory are not followed by all countries 
and some countries such as Algeria, Egypt and Lebanon have actually experienced 
an increase in fertility rates in recent years (Engelhardt et al. 2018), although these 
countries have made signifi cant progress toward development. Moreover, evidence 
indicates that MENA countries have higher fertility rates than would be the case 
in other countries at identical levels of development and the fertility-development 
link is weaker in MENA countries (Tabutin/Schoumaker 2005). This asserts that 
 fertility and development trends in the MENA region may be different from Western 
countries and what established theories suggest.
In this study, we examine how the fertility-development relationship has evolved 
over time in MENA countries and compare it to the relationships in Western 
countries. We also separately assess how the three components – living standards, 
education and health – of development, as well as female labour force participation1 
as an indicator of gender equality are related to fertility in these two contexts to test 
1 Similar to the previous studies (e.g., Luci-Greulich/Thévenon (2014), female labour force 
participation has been used as an indicator of gender equality in our analyses.
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the relevance of each component of development as well as gender equality. Our 
study contributes to the literature in two regards.
First, we test the importance of development for fertility in two contexts with 
substantially different levels and progress in gender equality and fertility: MENA 
countries with the lowest levels of gender equality and relatively high levels of 
development and Western countries with advanced levels of gender equality and 
development. Given the relevance of gender equality to the fertility-development 
nexus as suggested by theoretical arguments (Anderson/Kohler 2015; Esping-
Andersen/Billari 2015; Goldscheider et al. 2015; McDonald 2000b), these two 
contexts might have different fertility-development patterns. We test this by 
comparing how the correlation between fertility and development differs between 
Western and MENA countries.
Second, we revisit the relationship between fertility and development in 
advanced economies. Harttgen and Vollmer (2014) showed that the reversal in the 
TFR-HDI relationship found by Myrskylä et al. (2009) is not robust for the UNDP 
revision of the HDI calculation method. Using more recent data, we test whether a 
reversal from negative to positive exists between TFR and HDI.
We combine Human Development Index datasets (HDI; UNDP 2019), which 
contain information on various development indicators with datasets from the 
World Development Indicators (WDI; World Bank 2018), which contain annual 
information on fertility. We fi rst estimate the time-series association between 
fertility and development (or its components and female labour force participation) 
while controlling for country-specifi c fi xed effects. Second, we apply the difference-
in-differences strategy of Myrskylä et al. (2009) to examine the overall relationship 
between fertility and development.
2 Fertility, Development and Gender Equality
Western countries
In the historical decline in fertility, the key pre-transitional factor was mortality, 
especially infant mortality (Davis 1945; Mason 1997). Western countries have 
achieved remarkable reductions in mortality rates with rising incomes, urbanization 
and industrialization. For instance, evidence from four European countries shows 
that whilst infant mortality rates ranged from 100 deaths per 1,000 live births in 
the late 19th century, by the 1950s they ranged from 20 to 50 deaths per 1,000 live 
births (Corsini/Viazzo 1993). Subsequently, the decline in mortality led to a shift 
from a high to a low fertility regime between the late 19th to the early 20th century. 
Over the course of the demographic transition, Europe’s distinct past characterized 
by Malthusian cycles that emphasize a positive fertility-economic growth link 
started breaking down with the exception of the baby boom as a period when 
development was accompanied by a rise in fertility (Caldwell 1982; Guinnane 2011). 
Recent research, indeed, has empirically confi rmed the importance of childhood 
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survivorship in childbearing decisions (Reher et al. 2017). Mortality has not only 
infl uenced childbearing decisions, but also the timing and prevalence of marriage. 
Although “truly modern demographic behaviour could not begin before childhood 
mortality declined to insignifi cant levels” (Reher 2021: 4), mortality alone does not 
explain the shift from very high to very low fertility rates. Many other factors, such 
as the gender revolution (Goldin 2006), the interaction between women’s labour 
force participation and the lack of institutional adjustment, cultural and ideological 
innovations that led to greater behavioural freedom (Lesthaeghe 1983) and more 
individualistic attitudes (Van De Kaa 1987), have attracted the attention of scholars.
In the 20-30 years that followed the end of the baby boom, Western countries 
experienced rapid social and cultural changes. The trend converged in most 
advanced countries, albeit with visible differences in timing, tempo and degree 
accompanied by rapid economic growth. For instance, the shift away from the 
male breadwinner model had begun in the 1960s and accelerated in the 1970s in 
Scandinavia and North America, whereas similar transitions in countries like West 
Germany and Spain occurred with a delay of one or two decades (Esping-Andersen 
2009). Reher (2021) emphasized the historical baggage of societies that drives these 
differences. The key determinants of historical baggage were the relative importance 
of the individual, family and religion in society (Derosas/van Poppel 2006; Inglehart/
Baker 2000; Reher 1998).
These progressive tendencies clashed with norms shaped by the regime of male 
breadwinner/female housewife. Neither the status nor the bargaining power of 
women increased at the same pace, despite their non-negligible involvement in the 
economy (Goldin 1990). Consequently, a confl ict arose between individual-oriented 
social institutions with a high degree of gender equality and family-oriented social 
institutions with persistent gender inequality, resulting in very low fertility among 
Western countries (McDonald 2000a/b). Having children and starting a family was 
associated with child-rearing, domestic work and male breadwinner roles. This in 
turn was perceived as a barrier to women’s careers. The marketable skills of men 
and women began to converge as women became more involved in the economy. 
As a result, the cost of childbearing for women increased substantially, which 
reduced the returns of marriage (Becker 1974). Subsequently, new ways of living 
together such as cohabitation started emerging, whereas partnerships became less 
stable and fertility declined (Lesthaeghe 2010).
Rising levels of development and gender equality were paralleled by fertility 
decreases in societies with high levels of gender inequality. Most Western countries 
had low fertility rates at the end of the 20th century with some exceptions such as 
France where fertility rates remained relatively high, despite low levels of gender 
inequality (Population Reference Bureau 2007). Yet Rindfuss and Brewster (1996) 
argued that changes in the social organization of work and childcare arrangements 
would alter these trends and that easing women’s confl icts in balancing work and 
family life courses would lead to an increase in fertility. Similarly, McDonald (2000b) 
pointed to a reversal of the macro relationship between fertility and gender equality 
in the long run. He argued that institutions would develop reforms that support 
rising fertility at advanced levels of gender equality. This is more recently supported 
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by Esping-Andersen and Billari (2015) who suggested that the declines in fertility 
with the increasing number of women involved in the economy would be reversed 
as societies approach gender egalitarianism. Increasing gender equality at both 
institutional and household levels would allow individuals to have their desired 
number of children while ensuring the reconciliation of work and family life courses 
(Anderson/Kohler 2015; Myrskylä et al. 2011). Goldscheider et al. (2015) further 
emphasized the male involvement in family life for reversing fertility trends. In line 
with these theoretical expectations, the focus of family policies in many Western 
countries has shifted to the expansion of parental leave for both men and women 
and the provision of childcare that aimed at reducing work-family confl icts.
Several studies supported these recent theories suggesting a reversal/U-shaped 
pattern for the relationship between fertility and development empirically. Myrskylä 
et al. (2009) showed that the relationship between development and fertility reverses 
from negative to positive after a certain threshold. In the same vein, Luci-Greulich 
and Thévenon (2014) found a change in the relationship between fertility and GDP per 
capita above a certain threshold of economic development for 30 OECD countries. 
Moreover, by decomposing GDP per capita into several components, they identifi ed 
female employment as a co-varying factor in the fertility rebound. This conclusion is 
consistent with theoretical expectations (Anderson/Kohler 2015; Esping-Andersen/
Billari 2015; Goldscheider et al. 2015; McDonald 2000a/b; Myrskylä et al. 2011; 
Rindfuss/Brewster 1996): Countries with high levels of development as measured 
by health, income and education, but low levels of gender equality, continue to 
experience declining fertility.
Empirical fi ndings on the relationship between fertility, development and gender 
equality, however, are not entirely consistent. Furuoka (2009) found a negative 
association between fertility and development in countries with lower levels of 
development, whereas the relationship remained negative, albeit weak, in countries 
with a high HDI. In the same vein, Harttgen and Vollmer (2014) found no evidence for 
the inverse J-shaped association using the recent revision of the HDI calculation. By 
utilizing gender equality, Kolk (2019) examined the infl uence of gender equality on 
fertility in 35 developed countries. The results showed that a U-shaped pattern was 
only observed across countries and that changes within countries did not lead to a 
reversal of fertility and gender equality.
MENA countries
In contrast to Western countries, mortality in MENA countries was very high in the 
fi rst half of the 20th century. Crude death rates were close to 25 percent and life 
expectancy was about 40 years until the 1950s. In the same vein, fertility rates were 
very high, reaching seven or eight children per woman. In the second half of the 20th 
century, mortality in the MENA countries was signifi cantly reduced. Infant mortality 
rates fell from about 200 deaths per 1,000 live births in the 1950s to less than 50 
deaths per 1,000 live births by the end of the century (Roudi 2001) reaching levels 
that Western countries had half a decade ago. Along with the decline in mortality, 
fertility fell to below six and fi ve in the 1980s and 1990s, respectively and then to 
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3.1 in the early 2000s (World Bank 2017). Nevertheless, these rates were still higher 
than the average fertility rates that developed countries had in the 1950s (i.e., 2.8; 
World Bank 2018).
The fertility decline occurred late in comparison to other regions and concealed 
diversity in the pace of change between countries and sub-regions. For instance, 
in 2016, Saudi Arabia had a total fertility rate of 2.4, whereas women in Jordan had 
3.5 children on average (World Bank 2017). Tabutin and Schoumaker (2005) further 
showed that the relationship between fertility and development is very weak. At 
same HDI level, total fertility rates ranged from 2.0 in Tunisia to 4.1 in Saudi Arabia. 
Moreover, fertility in many MENA countries is signifi cantly higher than it would be 
elsewhere at the same level of development.
While the rapid decline in fertility in MENA countries is not negligible, fertility 
in several countries such as Jordan, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia has stabilized 
since the mid-2000s (Bel Air 2017). Some countries such as Algeria and Egypt 
even experienced an increase in fertility in this period (Engelhardt et al. 2018). 
Krafft (2020) recently argued that Egypt’s demographic transition is not stalling but 
reversing by showing that Egypt’s fertility rate reached 3.5 in 2012 after reaching 
a low of 3.0 in 2008. Even in the fi rst decade of the 21st century, about 3 out of 4 
MENA countries had fertility rates well above the replacement level (World Bank 
2018), despite declining infant mortality rates and development progress. One 
explanation for these observed trends could be that the cultural and ideological 
innovations that triggered gender equality in Western countries were not yet present 
in the MENA region. Women’s participation in the economy remained considerably 
low, while the returns of marriage for women were still high. Moghadam (2001) 
emphasized that the kind of development that was witnessed in the MENA countries 
reinforced patriarchal gender contracts in the MENA region. The idea is consistent 
with McDonald’s (2000b: 432) proposition, which posits that “[t]he transition from 
high fertility to fertility around replacement level is accompanied by an increase in 
gender equity within the institution of family.”
To explain the low level of gender equality in the region, scholars pointed out, on 
the one hand, that this low level of gender equality is due to the Islamic traditions in 
the region (e.g., Sharabi 1992) and the poor treatment of Muslim women (Inglehart/
Norris 2003; Landes/Landes 2001). On the other hand, Ross (2008) argued that low 
female employment and gender equality and high fertility are not solely due to 
Islamic traditions, but to structural opportunities. He pointed to the oil revenue-based 
economies in the region that triggered a shift from export-oriented sectors such as 
agriculture and manufacturing to non-export-oriented sectors such as construction 
and retail. Subsequently, economic growth in the region was mainly generated by 
fl ows from oil-producing countries. While oil-producing countries mainly comprise 
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, other countries benefi tted indirectly 
from oil through remittances from migrant labourers and shared the characteristics 
of a rentier economy (World Bank 2013). 
Historically, authoritarian regimes provided public sector jobs and the MENA 
region had one of the largest public sectors in the world (Amin et al. 2012). 
Nevertheless, with this type of economic growth a growing fi scal burden of 
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an oversized public sector emerged that affected budgetary sustainability and 
prompted calls for downsizing and cuts in the public sector (Assaad/Barsoum 
2019). For instance, the pause in public sector hiring began in Egypt in the 1970s and 
the share of public sector employment in total employment declined from about 
35 percent in 2002 to about 20 percent in 2018 (Assaad/Barsoum 2019). Accordingly, 
the public sector share in hiring new entrants has fallen steadily in most MENA 
countries, despite progress in educational attainment and development.
Women in particular prefer public sector employment to the private sector in 
most MENA countries. There are several reasons for this, including the fact that 
public sector jobs are more hospitable and offer favourable and fl exible working 
conditions such as short working hours, job security and social benefi ts (Barsoum 
2016). Considering the norms that prioritize women’s domestic responsibilities, 
such characteristics make public sector jobs more popular among women than 
men (Barsoum 2019). As a result, despite the feminized public sector, women’s 
employment opportunities have been negatively impacted as public sector jobs that 
traditionally employed women have declined and private-sector jobs dominated in 
many MENA countries (Assaad/Krafft 2015). These emerging jobs in the private 
sector such as construction require physical strength and are dominated by men. 
Even the other economic pillars of the private sector that do not require physical 
strength are signifi cantly dominated by men. For instance, in 2020, less than 
9 percent of the tourism labour force was women in the MENA region (UNWTO 
2020). This mismatch between women’s rising educational attainment and stagnant 
labour force participation rates has been termed the “MENA paradox” (Assaad et 
al. 2020). As a result, women’s structural opportunities have not increased despite 
economic growth. Overall, the fertility-development nexus in MENA countries may 
show different patterns than in Western countries if progress towards development 
is not complemented by gender equality.
3 Data
We include time series of 19 MENA and 24 Western countries in our analyses. 
As there is no standardized list, we include those that are generally referred to 
as MENA countries: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United 
Arab Emirates (UAE) and Yemen.2 Western countries refer to the countries included 
by Myrskylä et al. (2009): Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the 
United Kingdom and the United States of America (USA). 
2 Iran and Turkey are included among MENA countries, given that they are located in the Middle 
East and share similar structural (i.e., type of economy) and cultural (i.e., religion) characteristics. 
Yet, as a robustness check, we only considered countries where Arabic is the offi cial language. 
Findings are reported in the Appendix, Table A2.
•    Zafer Buyukkececi, Henriette Engelhardt252
We use HDI data from the International Human Development Indicators 
database (UNDP 2019). It contains information on HDI and its components annually 
between 1990 and 2018. We use the revised version of HDI in which the calculation 
method was changed to the geometric mean. The HDI revision provides consistent 
measurements that are comparable over time and this time consistent index 
included: (i) gross domestic product (GDP) per capita at purchasing power parity 
(PPP) referring to the standard of living, (ii) average of the adult literacy rate and the 
combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross school enrolment ratio referring to 
the human capital endowment and (iii) annual life expectancy at birth, referring to 
the health component of development. 
Fertility data, which is available yearly between 1960 and 2018, comes from 
the World Development Indicators (WDI; World Bank 2018). It is measured by the 
country-specifi c annual total fertility rate refl ecting the number of children that would 
be born to a woman during the considered age window if she experienced the age-
specifi c fertility rates observed in a particular year. The main weakness of the TFR 
is that it is subject to tempo effects of fertility (Bongaarts/Feeney 1998; Sobotka/
Lutz 2011). Tempo adjusted fertility measures may provide a more comprehensive 
overview of the fertility trends and may (partly) explain changing TFR (Bongaarts/
Sobotka 2012). Yet fertility changes in MENA countries differ greatly from those 
in advanced societies (see Balbo et al. 2013 for a review of fertility in advanced 
societies). Age-specifi c fertility rates have not experienced a shift to the right in 
most MENA countries, suggesting that the mean age at fi rst birth has not changed 
considerably in this region (Engelhardt et al. 2018). Accordingly, tempo effects are 
likely to be an issue only for the analysis of Western countries. While acknowledging 
this critique, other indicators of fertility such as age at fi rst birth are only available 
in time-series data every fi ve years between 1990 and 2015 and the TFR is the only 
available fertility measure for MENA countries that allows a longitudinal analysis 
of the fertility-development relationship.3 Moreover, it is plausible that the TFR 
provides extensive insight into fertility comparison between MENA and Western 
countries because it “is the most widely used indicator of fertility, as TFR is a key 
determinant of the number of children born in a calendar year and thus of population 
aging and population growth/decline” (Myrskylä et al. 2011: 38) and most public 
debates on fertility trends focus on the TFR.
4 Method
We estimated the relationship between fertility and development using two 
approaches. While the fi rst approach focused on how the association between fertility 
and development varies between different periods, the overall association between 
3 Nevertheless, in additional robustness checks, we replicated our models while controlling for 
the mean age at childbearing. Findings did not deviate strongly from the main outcomes and 
are reported in the Appendix.
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these two indicators was examined with the second strategy. More specifi cally, we 
fi rst applied linear regression models with fi xed effects at country-level separately 
for MENA and Western countries to examine the relationship between fertility and 
development with the following formula using time-series annual data:
where t indicated the year and c the country. The terms γc represented time invariant 
country-specifi c effects, which are accounted for with country fi xed effects and εtc is the error term. To examine how the fertility-development link evolved since 
1990, we compared the estimated coeffi cients of HDI(β) between six periods: 1990-
1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2004, 2005-2009, 2010-2014 and 2015-2018. We used robust 
standard errors clustered by country in all models to account for heteroscedasticity 
and deal with atypical countries.
We then examined the fertility-development link by adopting the difference 
estimation strategy of Myrskylä et al. (2009). Specifi cally, we estimated a piecewise 
linear model where the coeffi cient of HDI (or subindices of HDI and FLFP) can differ 
above and below a predetermined threshold value with the following equation: 
where t indicated the year and c the country. The coeffi cients βpre and βpost estimated 
the effects of HDI on TFR above and below the threshold value, respectively. ∆ 
referred to the difference indicator: ∆Xt = Xt - X(t-1) and . 
Differencing allows us to control for country fi xed-effects and account for the unit 
root from the residual autocorrelation. a n d were dummy variables 
indicating whether the HDI was below and above threshold value, respectively. γt 
denoted year-specifi c effects common to all countries. We tested whether there is a 
signifi cant reversal in the fertility-development relationship with this specifi cation.
To determine the threshold value, we also followed the strategy of Myrskylä et 
al. (2009) and used maximum likelihood methods. Equation 1 was estimated using a 
wide range of potential threshold values and the threshold value with the maximum 
log-likelihood function was used in the main analyses. 
5 Results
As the fi rst step of the analysis, we made a cross-country comparison of the 
relationship between TFR and HDI. We fi tted linear and polynomial prediction 
plots to display cross-country associations in Figure 1-4. These predicted plots 
describe the cross-country associations between fertility and development at two 
points in time (i.e., 1990 and 2018). Panel A and B of Figure 1 plot how the linear 
relationship varies across Western countries in 1990 and 2018, respectively. In both 
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prediction plots of Western countries illustrated in Figure 2, however, imply that the 
positive relationship between fertility and development reversed to negative at very 
advanced levels of development in 2018. Yet these fi ndings should be interpreted 
with caution given that the reversal is driven by a few countries. 
On the contrary, cross-country analyses of MENA countries indicate that fertility 
declined at higher levels of development, as shown in Figure 3. The predicted 
polynomial plots of MENA countries, shown in Figure 4, were similar to Figure 3 
with the exception that the negative relationship between fertility and development 
became weaker at the higher levels of development in 1990. Moreover, most MENA 
countries experienced notable declines in TFR between 1990 and 2018. While the 
average TFR of MENA countries was 4.88 in 1990, it decreased to 2.60 in 2018.
Table 1 shows the estimates of the linear regression models with country-level 
fi xed effects. Unlike the cross-sectional analysis in Figure 1, fertility and development 
trends of Western countries was negative in 1990-1994. This relationship became 
insignifi cant in the next two 5-year periods. Consistent with the recent demographic 
theories (Anderson/Kohler 2015; Esping-Andersen/Billari 2015; Goldscheider et 
al. 2015), the negative relationship between fertility and development reverses 
to positive in 2005-2009. This period relates to the most recent data analysed by 
Myrskylä et al. (2009), who found a reversal of the relationship between fertility 
and development from negative to positive. Yet the main fi ndings of Myrskylä et al. 
(2009) disappeared when we examined the most recent periods. In fact, fertility in 
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Western countries was negatively associated with development in 2010-2014 and 
2015-2018. These fi ndings suggest that the positive association between fertility 
and development in Western countries was temporary. In MENA countries, fertility 
declined signifi cantly and noticeably at the higher levels of development between 
1990 and 2004. Yet this relationship became insignifi cant in 2005-2009. In the 
subsequent periods (i.e., 2010-2014 and 2015-2018), unlike in Western countries there 
was also no longer a systematic relationship between fertility and development.
Fig. 2: Cross-country association between fertility and development with 
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HDI
HDI 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 2010-2014 2015-2018
Western -2.416** -0.966 0.032 4.404** -4.980*** -9.267***
(0.753) (0.794) (0.979) (1.494) (0.986) (2.260)
MENA -15.948*** -14.977*** -10.575*** -3.572 0.830 -2.137
 (4.456) (3.156) (2.126) (1.921) (1.402) (4.401)
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Source: UNDP (2017), World Bank (2018)
Tab. 1: Regression results (robust standard errors in parentheses)
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Results for the three HDI subindices and female labour force participation (FLFP) 
are presented in Table 2. For the education and health indices, fi ndings are very 
similar to Table 1, except that the negative relationship between fertility, on the 
one hand, and education and health, on the other hand, became signifi cant during 
the 2015-2018 period. In contrast, both Western and MENA countries’ standard of 
living was weakly associated with fertility.4 Only in 2005-2009 – the period when 
the fertility-development link became positive –, were estimated coeffi cients of 
the FLFP signifi cant for Western countries. This is in line with Luci-Greulich and 
Thévenon (2014), who found a positive relationship between female employment 
and fertility for within-country variation.
So far, we have examined how the association between TFR and HDI has 
changed over time. In Table 3, we adopted the difference-in-differences strategy of 
Myrskylä et al. (2009) and examined the overall relationship. In line with the fi ndings 
of Harttgen and Vollmer (2014), the estimated threshold value of HDI was 0.808 and 
there was no reversal in the fertility-development link among Western countries. 
4 Further analyses of MENA countries (not shown) where fertility was regressed on the three 
components of HDI together had illustrated that standard of living is positively associated 
with fertility when controlling for health and education in 2015-2018. This suggests that MENA 
region’s insignifi cant association between fertility and development in 2015-2018 was related 
to socioeconomic development.
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Moreover, while fertility was negatively related to education and health, standard 
of living was insignifi cantly associated with fertility in line with the fi ndings shown 
in Table 2.
Findings for MENA countries showed different patterns than those for Western 
countries. The calculated threshold was strikingly low, suggesting that the 
difference-in-differences strategy of Myrskylä et al. (2009) was not well suited for the 
MENA region. Moreover, development was insignifi cantly associated with fertility 
below the certain threshold value we determined. Yet fertility started increasing 
above this threshold value. While increasing levels of education and health were 
negatively linked to fertility below the threshold value we identifi ed, fertility rates 
were positively associated with education and health above this threshold value. 
Strikingly, fertility rates in MENA countries were positively related to socioeconomic 
development below the determined threshold value. For both Western and MENA 
countries, the overall relationship between fertility and FLFP was negative above 
the determined threshold value.
To strengthen confi dence in our fi ndings, we performed several additional 
analyses including controlling for mean age at childbearing, focusing only on Arabic-
speaking countries, using quinquennial fertility data, inclusion of a quadratic term 
and replicating the fi rst model by focusing on 10- and 15-year intervals. Findings 
were qualitatively robust to these specifi cations and are reported in the Appendix.
Fig. 4: Cross-country association between fertility and development with 
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6 Conclusion
In this study, we examined the association between fertility and development among 
Western and MENA countries. The main contribution of the present study is twofold. 
First, we showed that well-established theories of fertility and development may 
not apply in every context. While fertility and development have been negatively 
associated in Western countries in recent years, there was no signifi cant relationship 
in MENA countries during the same period. Indeed, further analyses where we 
focused on the overall relationship rather than specifi c periods implied that fertility 
and development is positively associated above the identifi ed threshold. A separate 
examination of the HDI components suggested that this association was mainly 
related to the standard of living component. These fi ndings of MENA countries are 
in line with McDonald (1994) and McNicoll (1980) who emphasize that the process 
of social change may not be the same across all societies and may be infl uenced by 
cultural and institutional contexts.
Tab. 2: Regression models with HDI components and FLFP rates (robust 
standard errors in parentheses)
1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 2010-2014 2015-2018
Panel A: Education
Western -1.196** -0.463 -0.022 1.579* -2.145** -6.818**
 (0.326) (0.458) (0.382) (0.736) (0.533) (2.038)
MENA -10.238** -9.215* -7.176*** -1.888 0.200 -4.639***
(3.457) (3.141) (1.259) (1.031) (0.975) (0.682)
Panel B: Standard of living
Western -0.931 -1.277 0.638 0.304 -2.345 -6.182**
 (1.564) (0.990) (2.598) (1.416) (2.539) (1.709)
MENA -2.111 -7.970** -1.511 -2.353 0.886 1.747
(1.603) (2.271) (2.465) (2.223) (0.751) (1.191)
Panel C: Health
Western -4.227* -2.449 -0.050 6.124*** -7.572*** -9.991***
 (1.752) (1.364) (1.545) (1.079) (1.545) (2.395)
MENA -26.570*** -25.713*** -12.642*** -4.296 -0.196 -7.567**
 (3.071) (5.007) (2.691) (3.333) (3.826) (2.217)
Panel D: FLFP
Western -0.005 0.004 0.007 0.032** -0.015 -0.025
 (0.010) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.014) (0.018)
MENA -0.092 -0.076 -0.016 -0.012 -0.009 0.022
 (0.080) (0.061) (0.042) (0.023) (0.020) (0.016)
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Source: UNDP (2017), World Bank (2018)
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Secondly, our analyses focusing on Western countries have shown that the 
relationship between fertility and development were signifi cantly positive for a 
short period (i.e., 2005-2009), yet afterwards the relationship became negative 
again. Moreover, analyses where we employed the difference-in-differences 
strategy of Myrskylä et al. (2009) indicated no reversal from negative to positive 
in the fertility-development link. Accordingly, we found no empirical evidence 
supporting recent demographic theories that suggest a reversal from negative to 
positive in the fertility-development link (Anderson/Kohler 2015; Esping-Andersen/
Billari 2015; Goldscheider et al. 2015). Furthermore, the difference-in-differences 
strategy implied that the overall association between fertility and female labour 
force participation was negative among both Western and MENA countries above 
the threshold value we determined. Yet these fi ndings should be interpreted with 
caution because we observed no signifi cantly negative relationships in the analyses 
where we focused on how this relationship changed over time in both Western 
and MENA countries. Moreover, the identifi ed threshold for MENA countries was 
considerably low, suggesting that the strategy of Myrskylä et al. (2009) is not 
particularly compatible.
We conclude with limitations and suggestions for further research. TFR is used 
to measure fertility throughout the analyses. Yet TFR is an imperfect measure 
given that it is affected by the timing of childbearing and both Western and MENA 
countries have experienced notable shifts in age of fi rst childbirth (Bongaarts 1999). 
At the same time, union formation was postponed in the MENA region in the 2000s 
together with development, resembling the nuptiality patterns of the Western 
world in the 1970s (Kuhn 2012; Ortega 2014). Moreover, evidence indicates that no 
Tab. 3: Regression results: Difference-in-differences (standard errors in 
parentheses)
HDI Education Standard of living Health FLFP
Western
Pre -0.656 -0.017 1.070 -1.332 0.000
(0.976) (0.448) (2.042) (2.762) (0.003)
Post -1.093* -0.390* -0.231 -4.784* -0.024**
(0.446) (0.161) (0.472) (1.873) (0.008)
Threshold value 0.808 0.716 0.806 0.866 0.737
MENA
Pre 0.059 -1.583* 3.657*** -5.581*** 0.003
(0.571) (0.806) (0.902) (1.518) (0.005)
Post 1.604* 0.541* 0.230 2.745* -0.022***
(0.628) (0.260) (0.207) (1.060) (0.005)
Threshold value 0.675 0.383 0.478 0.775 0.416
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Source: UNDP (2017), World Bank (2018)
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marriage regime has been able to reduce fertility in the MENA region (Engelen/
Puschmann 2011). Given that childbearing is mostly within marriage in MENA 
countries, fertility could be reduced due to the postponement of marriages among 
younger generations, leading to rebounds in the latter period. Accordingly, we note 
that TFR could not capture these trends. However, additional analyses where we 
controlled for timing of childbearing supported our main fi ndings, although these 
fi ndings should be interpreted cautiously due to limited available data on the timing 
of childbearing. Moreover, annual UN data on TFR is primarily based on a later 
interpolation of the quinquennial base data in most developing countries. Thereby, 
there could be less variability in TFR among MENA countries leading to biased 
standard errors. To acknowledge this, we replicated our analyses using the original 
quinquennial fertility data as a robustness check.
We assumed that development affects fertility in the analyses. Yet the effects 
could work in both directions: Fertility may affect development. We also expected 
that the fertility-development link of MENA countries is different from Western 
countries due to the distinct progress and evolution of gender equality in the region. 
Indeed, fertility-development trends of MENA countries are noticeably different 
from fi ndings on Western countries (Fox et al. 2019; Myrskylä et al. 2009, 2011) 
and theoretical expectations (Anderson/Kohler 2015; Esping-Andersen/Billari 2015; 
Goldscheider et al. 2015). Consequently, there could be factors such as barriers in 
the use of contraception, problems in women’s reconciliation of work and family 
life or unwanted fertility affecting these trends. These factors are not tested in this 
study. Why MENA countries show different fertility trends and have not become 
more gender-equal societies with increasing levels of development is beyond the 
scope of this paper and it would be interesting to elicit the drivers such as religion 
and/or structural opportunities of this trend. In conclusion, future research may 
elicit the drivers of a positive fertility-development link among Western countries 
that only emerged for a short period.
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Appendix
Additional analyses
Table A1 presents the fi ndings where we replicated the models focusing on 5-year 
intervals by considering 10- and 15-year intervals, respectively. In Table A2, we 
replicated the main models focusing on 5-year intervals with different specifi cations. 
In Panel A, we included only Arabic-speaking MENA countries by excluding Turkey 
and Iran and including Mauritania and Palestine. Although Malta has different 
structural and cultural characteristics than the MENA countries considered, we 
additionally used the World Bank defi nition of MENA countries and included Djibouti 
and Malta (not shown). In Panel B of Table A2, we examined how the TFR-HDI 
relationship changed in every fi ve year between 1990 and 2015 while controlling 
for timing of childbearing.5 The models were replicated using quinquennial fertility 
data in Panel C, given that the UN’s annual information on fertility is based on a 
later interpolation of the quinquennial base data in most developing countries.6 
Using these three specifi cations included in Table A2, we replicated the difference-
in-differences models of Myrskylä et al. (2009) and fi ndings are reported in Panel 
A-C of Table A3. All these models supported the conclusions drawn from the main 
models.
In Table A4, we estimated the non-linear time series association between fertility 
and development separately for Western and MENA countries by introducing a 
quadratic term of HDI with the following form:
where t indicated the year and c the country. The terms γc represented country-
specifi c effects, λt denoted year-specifi c effects common to all countries and εtc 
is the error term. The models focused on the period between 1990 and 2018 and 
included country-level and period fi xed effects to account for unobserved time-
constant country heterogeneity and variation in outcome over time that is not 
attributed to the predictors, respectively. For a better illustration of the results, 
we plotted the marginal effects obtained from the regression models in Figure A1. 
Accordingly, we present the expected instantaneous changes in the outcome as a 
function of a change in the main predictors. Overall, estimated results supported 
our main fi ndings. While fertility insignifi cantly decreased at higher levels of 
development among Western countries, MENA countries had higher fertility rates 
with increasing development.
5 These fi ndings should be interpreted with caution, given that the timing of childbearing data is 
available every fi ve years for the period 1990 to 2015.
6 Information on timing of childbearing and quinquennial base data is available until 2015. 
Therefore, these models were not estimated for the 2015-2018 period.
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Tab. A1: Regression results focusing on 10- and 15-year periods (robust 
standard errors in parentheses)
HDI 1990-1999 1995-2004 2000-2009 2010-2018
Western -2.238** -0.364 2.472** -2.633*
(0.735) (0.624) (0.766) (1.098)
MENA -15.856** -14.134*** -7.281** -0.204
(4.730) (2.104) (1.934) (1.915)
HDI 1990-2004 1995-2009 2000-2018
Western -1.387* 0.982 -0.048
(0.526) (0.631) (0.552) 
MENA -16.078*** -10.885*** -3.177
(2.951) (1.925) (1.743) 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Source: UNDP (2017), World Bank (2018)
Tab. A2: Robustness checks focusing on 5-year periods with different 
specifi cations (robust standard errors in parentheses)
HDI 1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2005 2005-2010 2010-2015 2015-2018
Panel A: Focusing on Arabic-speaking countries
MENA -13.267** -14.920*** -10.884*** -4.642 0.585 -0.170
(4.014) (3.265) (2.301) (2.432) (1.647) (0.199)
Panel B: Controlling for the timing of childbearing 
Western -1.117 1.497 1.071 0.571 -6.474**
(1.231) (0.991) (1.665) (2.017) (2.144)
MENA -21.106*** -15.812*** -9.798*** -1.932 1.297
(3.421) (2.958) (2.307) (2.121) (1.752)
Panel C: Using quinquennial fertility data 
Western -1.921* -0.387 2.967*** 0.572 -3.985***
(0.736) -0.641 -0.595 -0.959 -0.882
MENA -16.647*** -12.835*** -6.602* -1.221 -0.248
(2.920) (1.770) (2.506) (2.015) (1.144) 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Source: UNDP (2017), World Bank (2018)
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Tab. A3: Robustness checks with difference-in-differences strategy and different 
specifi cations (robust standard errors in parentheses)
Panel A: Focusing Panel B: Controlling Panel C: Using
on Arabic-speaking for the timing of quinquennial fertility
countries childbearing data





Threshold value   0.906 0.823
MENA     
Pre 2.041 6.009 0.759
(1.161) (4.812) (1.396)
Post -1.105 -4.661 1.435
(1.237) (4.910) (1.989)
Threshold 0.4 0.53  0.6
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Source: UNDP (2017), World Bank (2018)
Tab. A4: Non-linear association between fertility and development (robust 




HDI x HDI -2.074 3.128
 (8.581) (9.363)
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Source: UNDP (2017), World Bank (2018)
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